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Abstract-Secure access is prerequisite for a Mobile Personal
Device (MPD) in a Personal Network (PN). An authentication
method using biometrics, specifically face, is proposed in this
paper. A fast face detection and registration method based on a
Viola-Jones detector is implemented, and a face-authentication
method based on subspace metrics is developed. Experiments
show that the authentication method is effective with an Equal
Error Rate (EER) of 1.2%, despite its simplicity.
Index terms-biometrics; authentication; MPD; PN; subspace.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the context of the Personal Network (PN), the security of
user information in the network becomes especially important.
Therefore, the Mobile Personal Device (MPD), which links the
user and the network in mobile situations, puts forward high
demands on the user authentication.
The traditional way to protect the information is by tokens
or PINs (Personal Identification Number), which are easy to
implement, but constantly under the risk of being stolen, or
forgotten. Biometrics, the unique biological or behavioral
characteristics of a person, is one of the most popular and
promising alternatives to solve this problem [1]. It is
convenient for the user because it cannot be lost or forgotten,
and it is virtually the only form of authentication that ensures
the physical presence of the user. Based on biometrics, our
work aims at building up a secure, convenient, and efficient
interface between the MPD and the user in the PN.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II addresses the
challenges of biometric authentication in the MPD, Section III
proposes our solution, and Section IV presents the preliminary
results of the proposed system.
II. BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION IN THE MPD
A. Security Aspects
There are two types of authentication in the MPD scenarios:
authentication at logon time and at run time. The second type
of authentication is important because it can prevent
unauthorized users from taking an MPD in operation and
accessing confidential user information from the PN.
The false-accept rate (FAR) and the false-reject rate (FRR)
are used to quantify the biometric authentication performance.
The FAR specifies the probability that an imposter can use the
device, and is, therefore, closely related to security. The
traditional PIN code can achieve the FAR as low as 10'n, where
n is the length of the PIN digits. With the incorporation of
biometric authentication, the security at run time will be
realized. To guarantee the security both at logon time and run
time, the FAR of the biometric authentication system should be
sufficiently low.
B. Convenience Aspects
The FRR, on the other hand, is closely related to user
convenience. A false reject will force the user to re-enter
biometric data, which will cause annoyance. This obviously
leads to the requirement of low FRR of the biometric
authentication system.
In terms of convenience, a much higher degree of user-
friendliness can be achieved if the biometric authentication is
transparent, which means that the authentication can be done
without explicit user actions. Transparency should be
considered as a requirement for the authentication at run time,
because regularly requiring a user, who may be concentrating
on a task, to present the biometric data is neither practical nor
convenient.
C. Complexity Aspects
Ongoing authentication will constantly consume the
computational resources of the MPD. Because the MPD
operates in the PN, it offers the possibility that biometric
templates are stored in a central database and that the
authentication is done in the network. Although the constraints
on the algorithmic complexity become less stringent, this
option brings a higher security risk. Firstly, when biometric
data has to be transmitted over the network it is vulnerable to
eavesdropping [2]. Secondly, the biometric templates need to
be stored in a database and are vulnerable to attacks [3]. These
are problems difficult to solve. Conceptually, it is also
preferable to make the MPD authentication more independent
of other parts of the PN.
Therefore, the authentication needs to be implemented in
the MPD, and this requires that the complexity of the algorithm
be kept low, such that it can be executed on the MPD state-of-
the-art hardware, and while executed, does not disturb other
MPD functions.
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III. FACE RECOGNITION AS THE SOLUTION
The biometric we choose for the MPD application should
satisfy all three requirements listed above simultaneously. Face
recognition is among all biometrics a good choice. It is the only
biometrics that can be really transparent. By mounting a
camera on the MPD, the face images of the user can be caught
almost constantly. This is attractive because the cost for a
camera is low, and modern MPDs such as mobile phone and
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) normally have a camera
installed.
A. Face Preprocessing
Face preprocessing includes three steps, namely face
detection, face registration, and face normalization.
For fast face detection Viola and Jones proposed a detection
scheme which is very efficient by using simple rectangular
binary features and the integral image [4], and has proved to be
robust against varying background and foreground. The
training of the Viola-Jones detectors is slow, but the detector
only needs to be trained once offline, and then they can be
hardcoded in the device.
The importance of accurate face registration (alignment to a
reference) has been proved in [5] [6]. For the MPD application,
a Viola Jones detector is trained for 13 different facial features
(landmarks), as illustrated in the second row of Fig. 1. These
landmarks are combined into a shape, and then rigidly
registered to the reference shape. Furthermore, the face region
is masked to exclude the background influences. As illustrated
in the third row of Fig. 1 that only the upper part of the face is
considered, which is relatively constant under varying
expressions. Besides face registration, illumination
normalization is also an important issue in face recognition [7].
A simple high pass filter can act to equalize the luminance




Fig. 2. The DFFS and DIFS in a personal face space
B. Face Authentication in a Personal Face Space
Subspace methods belong to one of the most popular
methods in face recognition [8]. They are well defined and
simple, but need a large dataset in order to accurately estimate
the subspace. In the MPD application, the user is exposed
extensively to the device, thus a large sample set can be
obtained, which allows us to adopt a simple subspace method.
The enrollment of the face authentication system includes
the training of the subspace and the classifier. Suppose we have
the matrix X containing N feature vectors [xl,... , xN] as its
columns, then the matrix X° whose columns have zero mean
can be calculated by subtracting the column mean x from
every column of X. Then the eigenfaces are computed by
means of singular value decomposition (SVD).
X = USV (1)
where the columns of U are the eigenfaces spanning the
column space of X°, and the columns of V spanning the row
space of X°. S is a diagonal matrix with the diagonal entries
being the singular values. Let the first k columns of U be Uk,
with k such that most of the variance (e.g. 90%) is explained.
The projection of xi on the face space is
Y Uk Xi) (2)
We derive a further reduced feature vector with only two
dimensions: DIFS (distance in feature space) and DFFS
(distance from feature space) [9], which are illustrated in Fig.
2. The DFFS measure is the residual error of the projection
onto the face space, normalized with respect to the norm of the
mean face vector:
DFFS(x ) = (I UkUk )(X -X)
i1
(3)
where I is the identity matrix. The DIFS measure is the
Mahalanobis distance calculated by:
DIFS(x, ) = y'(Sk2) 'i (4)
where yi is computed from (2), and Sk is the upper
submatrix of S in (1).
left kxk
IV. EVALUATION OF THE BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION
Fig. 1. Face feature extraction procedure (from top down): face detection,
facial feature detection, face registration and masking, high-pass filtering.
A. Experiment Setup
The face images with a size of 320x240 pixels are collected
by a Philips HQ-TRIPODID webcam. In the experiment we
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collected 4,000 frames for each of the 6 individuals. By
flipping every image horizontally, 8,000 images are obtained
per person. For face detectors, we use the pre-trained Viola-
Jones detector provided by the Intel OpenCV library [10]. For
training the facial landmark detectors, the BiolD database is
used [1 1]. The details of this process was reported in [12].
After face and landmark detection, the face image is
registered to the size of 32 by 32, and the further reduced to
17x21 = 357 by masking. Illumination normalization is done
by first filtering every image by a Gaussian low-pass filter, the
scale of which normalized to 1/10 of the inter-ocular distance.
Then this image is subtracted from the original image, retaining
only the high-frequency details of the face.
For each individual, the face data was then split in such a
way that 60% of the data are used for training the personal face
space, 20% as the validation set for building the classifier, and
20% as the testing set for evaluating the performance of the
subspace and the classifier. The subspace has a dimensionality
of 200. For each individual, we randomly take 1,000 faces from
each of the other 5 individual to train the classifier, and another
1,000 to evaluate the classifier.
From (3) and (4) we calculate the feature vector of DFFS
and DIFS, both for the authentic user and the imposters. As an
example, Fig. 3 illustrates the scatter plot of one authentic user
and the imposters. The circles indicate the scattering of the
training data and validation data, and the dots indicate the
scattering of the testing data. A Parzen classifier based on
posterior probability estimation of the distribution is trained
[13], which is also illustrated in Fig. 3.
B. FAR andFRR
By assuming different priors of the authentic user and the
imposter, and adjusting the decision boundary of the Parzen
classifier accordingly, the Receiver Operative Curve (ROC)
can be acquired, which describes the relationship between the
FRR and the FAR. Fig. 4 shows the ROC of both the training
set and test set. The optimal operation point, therefore, can be
selected from this curve based on the specific requirement of
the application. As a general measure of classification
performance, the Equal Error Rate (EER) is also calculated. As
shown in Fig. 4, the EER of this face authentication for the





Fig. 3. The scatter plot of DFFS and DIFS for authentic user data and
imposter data. Parzen classifier boundary is also shown.
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Fig. 4. ROC of both validation data and testing data
V. CONCLUSIONS
The security of the MPD in the PN is very important. Our
work aims at building up a secure, convenient, and efficient
connection between the MPD and the user in the PN, based on
biometrics authentication. Simple and effective algorithms are
developed for face recognition in a MPD. Experiments show
that our face authentication method can achieve an EER as low
as 1.2% under current experiment setup. In the future work,
extensive experiments on more users under large lighting
variations will be done. With further efforts on optimizing the
algorithm and building up the system in real MPD hardware,
the perspective of the biometric authentication in a PN is
promising.
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